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Abstract 
 establishes an important pattern of agricultural economy specialization and 
formalization in China. The brand is the external performance of  organizational reputation. Key to the sustainable 
development of the program lies in whether all the peasant households maintain brand is. This paper focuses on an 
evolutionary game model, which reveals  behavior features of brand maintenance. It is found that 
the peasant househ r evolved result would create the low efficiency of collective brand maintenance if they do 
not treasure personal reputation. It is proposed that the agricultural cooperation organizations should become the carriers of 
The peasant households will treasure personal reputation in the agricultural 
cooperation organizations, so the interaction between the personal reputation and organizational reputation could drive the 
peasant households to maintain collective brand  spontaneously. Finally, an actual case is illustrated to support the model. 
Keywords: One Village, One Product; Personal Reputation; Organizational Reputation Evolutionary Game Theory; Association Game 
Theory 
1. Introduction 
The one village, one product  program is an important pattern of agricultural economic development in 
China. Taking village as the fundamental unit, it makes full use of local resource advantages, traditional 
advantages and regional advantages in certain area, in accordance with the domestic and foreign market 
demands. Through promoting the constructions of formalization, standardization, branding, and market izat ion, 
one or several villages can have one or several leading products or industries, which have great market 
potentials, outstanding regional characteristics, and high added value, so as to improve the overall rural 
economic strength and comprehensive competitiveness. On one hand, brand establishment and maintenance, 
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which is the external performance of collective reputation, is the key to the program sustainable development. 
On the other hand, since collective brand has  a property of public products, the peasant households tend to lift  
in order to promote their reputation. If one peasant household failed to should the responsibility, it would 
probably ruin the whole organizational reputation. 
On November 16, 2003, CCTV Weekly Quality Report reported a vicious incident that two ham factories, 
Yongtai and Xuchun of Jinhua City in Zhejiang Province, had manufactured exp ired hams with the legs of sick 
pigs, dead pigs, and old sows as raw materials and immersed in hypertonic pesticide of DDT, in order to seek 
exorbitant profits of moment. The consumers were stunned, panicked, and infuriated by these hams. The 
millennium brand of Jinhua Ham was blown up completely overnight. In December 2007, Professor Wang 
Shuguang of Peking University carried out an investigation on Mentougou Cow Association  in Beijing and 
rural dairy peasant households. His investigation found that in Mentougou Cow Association, peasant 
households had a large degree of freedom that they were free to choose to join or not. When the milk price was 
to the advantage of dairy peasant households, they would sell their milk to the dairy company; and when the 
milk price was against them, they would seek help  from Cow Association. This kind of Dairy peasant 
households  behavior made it  impossible to maintain the organizational brand. In the summer of 2009, when 
the base research team of Jiangsu Food Safety Research to which the author belonged conducted an 
investigation on the pesticide using behavior of tea peasant households of Anji white tea , they found that 
while the other tea peasant households applied the bio- pesticides as required, some peasant households secretly 
applied chemical pesticides to reduce costs. On the premise of the third party s difficult monitoring, the 
agricultural products manufactured by tea farmers with the application of chemical pesticides may still be 
purchased as environmental undamaged products.  
Granovetter (1985) thinks that the behavior of the organizational members is deeply limited by the network 
relationships, and that it is a great mistake to take them as separate objects[1].With the growing rural 
atomizat ion , the relations among peasant households are rather loose. Peasant households tend to act upon 
maximizing short- term gain, while paying little attention to future revenue attributable to personal reputation. 
Usually, they only imitate the relatively successful strategies, regardless of the possible reputation impairment. 
Therefore, on the premise of the lack o f effective interaction between  personal reputation and organizat ional 
reputation, mutual learning among peasant households will cause the low efficiency of maintain ing the 
collective brand. Th is paper believes that the agricultural cooperation organizat ions should become the carriers 
of the one village, one product  program. Through the evolutionary game between agricultural cooperation 
organizations and the one village, one product  program, the interaction between personal reputation and 
organizational reputation can drive to the birth of the restraint mechanism of collective brand  maintenance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In  section 2, we briefly review relevant literature, in which the 
history line of research development is combed. In section 3, we analyze the learn ing evolution process of 
collective brand maintenance behavior, applying the evolutionary game model theory. In section 4, we studies 
the possibility of the interaction between personal reputation and organizational reputation, through 
constructing a game model on the association between one village, one product  program and agricultural 
cooperation organizations, In  section 5, we support the model with a case, using the research conducted by the 
author in Zhengzhou, Henan Province as an actual case. In Section 6, we draw a conclusion on the basis of the 
above mentioned. 
2. Literature Review 
The implementation of one village, one product  program brings brand effect into play, enhances the 
credibility and visibility of agricultural products and meets consumers  requirements in terms of quality and 
safety of agricultural products. Based on the surveys of nine regions in seven provinces nationwide, Zhongze 
Feng and Qingjiang Li(2008)give an empirical analysis on consumers  awareness of agricultural products  
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quality and safety conditions and their consumption behavior.The results show that consumers are more 
concerned about the brand and the credibility of agricultural products [2].Yunyan Wang and Liming 
Chen(2009)borrow the classical signal transmission model in in formation economics to analyze agricultural 
products  brand signal transmission effect, and the result ind icates that the brand signal of agricu ltural products 
which is processed under credibility construction can show the quality of the products [3]. McCluskey and 
Loureiro(2003)borrow Hedonic model to evaluate the Spanish consumers  willingness to pay high prices for 
the fresh pork with geographical marks, whose result shows that fresh pork with geographical marks can get 
higher prices than ordinary pork[4].Besides, Winfree and McCluskey(2005)reveal that collective brand of 
agricultural products have the characteristics of public products. Under the framework of dynamic optimization, 
they also explain that producers will have the tendency to produce low-quality agricu ltural products if there 
exists credibility rent and lacks traceable mechanism[5].Evans and Guinnane(2007)believe that the success of 
many producers to create collective brand must meet two  conditions: producers do not have obvious 
differences and that the marginal cost of production decreases[6]. 
Many scholars believe that the existence of the majority of peasant households Free-riding  mentality 
makes the co-production run inefficient. For example, Dapeng Ren and Haixia Guo(2008)insist that if farmers 
cannot overcome the free riding , individual peasant households will be caught in the dilemma of collective 
action, leading to the creation of collective brand cannot be achieved [7].Xiangzhi Kong and Danmei 
Chen(2008)find that because the organizational mechanis m cannot prevent other peo ple within the organization 
from free-riding, the leaders lack the enthusiasm to organize co-production[8].After a survey on peasants in 
Henan, Jinqing Cao(2000)brings forward  the proposition of peasant households are good at separation instead 
of cooperation , which triggers a sustained discussion on peasants  cooperation ability[9].Xuefeng 
He(2006)believes that since the reform and opening up, peasant households have become opened and the 
number of flow between peasant households has increased, the number of games between peasant households 
has changed from many t imes to one time, thus long-term cooperation between peasant households becomes 
difficult. Because the cooperative participants cannot punish uncooperative participates, so long as the external 
opportunities are good enough, peasants will have the impetus to  first get slacking and then quit so that they 
can obtain external opportunities  or they have the external opportunities but do not cooperate with others [10]. 
Through literature review, we find that there exist two aspects of deficiencies in current research: (1) When 
analyzing the Free-riding  behavior in  the process of collective brand maintenance, only static analyses are 
given; (2) When analyzing the possibility of forming a restraint mechanism to maintain collective brand, 
analyses are not given under the framework of agricultural cooperation organizat ions. Based on this, this paper 
will apply evolutionary game model to dynamically analyze peasant households  collective brand maintenance 
behavior Free-riding , and to take the peasant households  one village, one product  program and the 
relation game between agricu ltural cooperation organizat ions as breakthrough points to construct self restraint 
mechanism of collective brand maintenance. 
3. Evolutionary Game Theory of Collective Brand Maintenance 
Xuefeng He(2009)believes, on account of the long-term rat ional life, the peasant households have formed 
a special code of conduct that they judge and weigh their actions on the basis of compar ing with others
instead of they earn[10].Similarly, in  the process of  
 program of collective brand maintenance, the peasant households often choose the plan which can 
maximize the utility r. Free- r becomes the peasant households ' 
rational choice under certain  conditions.Next, through constructing evolutionary game model, we proves that if 
decentralized peasant households don't value personal reputation which brings long-term benefits, it may lead 
to this consequence that  group participating 
not strive to maintain organizational reputation in the long-term evolution. 
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Evolutionary game theory main ly includes two kinds of common  learning model: the best response 
dynamics and the replicator dynamics. The best response dynamics is suitable for s mall group members having 
rapid learning ab ility to do repeated game, while replicator dynamics is suitable for members of the large 
groups with slow learn ing ability to do the random pairing of repeated game. Considering the peasant 
households who , be approximately thought of as a large 
group, we will use replicator dynamics mechanism to simulate the households
that the peasant households , with no difference, they can 
choose from two strategies in collect ive brand maintenance actions Free-riding
means the peasant households can abide by the standards, such as using the qualified 
pesticide, employing the standardized planting method and so on; w Free-rid
violation of norms, that is to say, the households use toxic pesticides and plant randomly.  
For agricultural p roducts, buyout firms  can only do sampling inspection about its quality in the purchase 
(for example, at present, there are not many agricultural testing point in the cities in Hainan province. Each 
town basically  has only one testing station.Therefore, sampling test should be the realistic choice  for testing 
agricultural product at present in China).When there are unqualified agricultural products detected, all the 
peasant households ; conversely, takeovers will be done at the 
qualified agricultural prices.We consider all the peasant households , one pr are 
playing game in  random pair,  and assume that in the init ial state the proportion of peasant households using 
C  and using Free-r  is x :1 x . We establish a symmetrical game model 
to describe the evolution process of peasant households Free- r without considering personal 
reputation influence (as shown in figure 1 below). 
 
                                                                                        Peasant households 2 
 
 
Peasant households 1  
 
Fig.1 2x2 symmetrical game model without considering the personal reputation 
According to the above assumption, we can easily know: when all peasants 
buyout firms will purchase all agricultural products in accordance with qualified agricultural product prices; 
when part of the households choose ose Free-r
r will lead to a certain probability takeover of agricultural 
products; when all the peasant households Free-r
detected unqualified and can t be purchased, then every peasant households  benefit will be 0. 
The definition of the parameters in game theory model: 
1 the benefit of each peasant householder when all the peasant households C
strategy  
2 the expected benefit of the peasant households who C  strategy when 
another part of peasant households choose the Free-riding  
2 R the expected benefit of the peasant households Free-riding
another part of peasant households  
Without loss of generality , 1 2 0R  (I Free-
than  strategy. For example, in the beginning of the 2010, when the reporter investigated the 
Hainan province poisonous cowpea incident, he finds that the low toxicity pesticide is 10 yuan higher than the 
 Cooperation Free-Riding 
Cooperation 1 1,  2 2, R  
Free-Riding 2 2,R  0,0  
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forbidden high toxicity pesticide.) 
The adaptability of the peasant households who use the cooperation strategy: cu , the adaptability of the 
peasant householder who use the Free-riding strategy: fu , the average adaptability of all the peasant 
householders: u , 
1 2(1 )cu x x  
1 1(1 ) ( )fu x x R  
(1 )c fu x u x u  
According to the analysis above, it can be get the replication dynamic equation of peasant households
collective brand maintenance behavior 
( )c
dx x u u
dt 1 2 2
(1 )[ ( ) (1 ) ]x x x R x  
When 0dx
dt






x R  
s differential equation, the gradient of tangent line which is 
stable should be less than 0 , it can be found that neither  0x  or 1x  is ESS, because both of the 





x R is less than 0, so it is 
ESS.  It indicated that when the evolution comes to stability, the proportion of peas ant householders who use 












0                                                                                                             1 
Fig. 2 duplication dynamic equation phase diagram 
 






 shows the proportion of the peasant households who use the 
C







In other words, when the speculation benefit is more, in the long run, no peasant householder will do his 
best to protect the Organizational Reputation. 
 
Fig. 3 relations diagrams between ESS value and R 
According to the analysis above, it comes to the theorem1: 
Theorem 1 The short term speculation benefit R  from the "Free-riding" strategy will be the key 
parameter which affects the portion of peasant households who are willing to protect the organization 
reputation.When the evolution comes to stable, the proportion of the peasant householders who are 
willing to protect the organization reputation is the monotone decreasing function about R . 
4. Association Game Theory between t  program and agricultural 
cooperation organizations 
The conclusion above indicates Free-rid ing
strategy will be the rational choice of the peasant h
every peasant households is not willing to protect the organization brand; the decline of the organization 
reputation is an inevitable trend. The peasant householders do not attach enough import ance to the long term 
situation. For example, due to the low degree of organization
district of Suqian, a city  in  Jiangsu Province, can  not get rid of scattered product and one family  operation, the 
brand effect is not strong.Therefore, developing 
householders to agricultural cooperation organizat ions, building one 
 program and agricu ltural cooperation organizat ions, accelerating the interaction between 
personal reputation and organizational reputation, is the effective measure to protect the collective brand of the 
 program.  
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Suppose it is obligatory to join in agricultural cooperation organizations for those peasant households who 
program, their performance in these two programs can be connected as 
a relating game. Peasant households are entitled to services and benefits like technical guidance and credit aids 
offered by the agricultural cooperation organizations, on condition that they maintain their individual reputat ion 
ensured by disciplined production. However, the peasant households shall be expelled from the organization 
Free-riding collective brand of 
program. Here from, an investigation is carried out on the reputation interaction between peasant 
households and the organization in the framework of association game theory. 
Free-riding collective brand maintenance, the 
peasan  0r . 
0 2
1
rr r r L L , is the discount factor 
The current speculative profit obtained by Free-riding  is
1
rR , and the simple gain matrix of 
2 2symmetry game will be changed which is shown as in Fig. 4: 
 




households 1     
 
 
Fig. 4 2x2symmetry game model with considering the personal reputation 







Ideally speaking, it is hoped that all peasant households are voluntarily adopting Cooperation  to 
maintain the organizational reputation since their individual reputation has been restricted. That is to say, ESS 







which can be simplified as: 1 2
(1 )( )Rr  
 Cooperation Free- riding 
Cooperation 1 1,  2 2, 1
rR  
Free-riding 2 2,1
rR  0,0  
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When 1 2
(1 )( )Rr , the replicator dynamics equation of the phase diagram is as illustrated 
in Fig. 5: 





0                                              1         x  
 
Fig. 5 the replicator dynamics equation of the phase diagram in an ideal situation 
Though peasant  strong motivation may be expected during the operation of collective brand 
maintenance, as long as the personal reputation can bring a benefit  r  which satisfies a 
condition 1 2
(1 )( )Rr , the forbiddance of Free-riding  in this case can be a credible threat. 
Meanwhile, an endogenous constraint mechanism is generated by the effective reputation interaction between 
the individual and the organization, which to assure the adoption of cooperation  to maintain the collective 
brand. Based on the above analysis, Theorem 2 can be drawn: 
Theorem 2  As long as the parameter meets a condition: 1 2
(1 )( )Rr , namely, 
personal reputation brings a higher benefit, the reputation interaction between the individual and the 
organization will restrict the adoption of Cooperation  strategy.
5. Case Analysis 
Based on the above model analysis, it is believed that the peasant households are more willing to ensure the 
quality of agricultural products in order to maintain  the organizational reputation when conducting 
 program supported by agricultural cooperation organizations . In 2009, a  comprehensive 
investigation was carried out; whose partial results can be a further proof of the above model analysis 
conclusion. 
The main research subjects of this investigation are staff from  programs in 
Zhengzhou city, in Henan Province such as the owners of food companies, middle -level executives (who are in 
charge of comprehensive management, environmental management, resource management, and market ing and 
foreign trade management), etc. The research focuses on the common problems in the development of food 
production and processing enterprises, which intends to provide decision basis for the government in enhancing 
the development of food industry. The following is obtained from the questionnaire on the production 
management of food enterprises . 
-
pollution agricultural ompanies give the affirmat ive 
answer (as shown in the Fig.6). 








Fig.6 the ratio of the companies whether they count on  agricultural cooperation organizations. 
The reasons for these 65% companies are as fo llows (multiple  choices): 1) cost reduction; 2) quality security 
of raw material; 3) stable supply of raw material; 4) others (make it clear). Among 72 companies, 46 of them 
vote for the second reason (as shown in the Tab.1). 
Tab.1 the reasons for companies to count on agricultural cooperation organizations 
 cost reduction quality security of raw 
material 
stable supply of  
raw material 
others 
Numbers 30 46 38 7 
Ratio 41.67% 63.89% 52.78% 9.72% 
 
As to this question: Which items are included in the quality detection of raw material supplied by peasant 
households in your company? (Multiple  choices): 1) go bad or not; 2) have veterinary drug residue or not; 3) 
heavy metal within or without limit; 4) have blight or not; 5) others, the choices are as shown in the Tab.2. 
Tab.2 the items included in the quality detection of raw material supplied by peasant households in these companies 
 go bad or not have 
veterinary 





have blight or 
not 
others 
Numbers 48 34 22 21 14 
Proportion 66.67% 47.22% 30.56% 29.17% 19.44% 
 
As to this question In order to secure the quality security of raw material, which of the following measures 
your company will take (multiple  choices)? 1) To set the standards or norms; 2) To supply seedling; 3) to 
provide key  technical instruction; 4) To g ive peasant households free training; 5) Others (make it  clear), the 
choices are as shown in the Tab.3. 
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Tab.3 Measures companies take to secure the quality security of raw material












Numbers 52 7 23 14 8
Proportion 72.22% 9.72% 31.94% 19.44% 11.11%
As to this question: Do close combinations of agricultural cooperation organizat ions make a difference in
the quality security? 1) Yes; 2) No. , 69% of these companies choose .7).
Fig.7 the ratio of the companies which improve the quality of agricultural products in agricultural cooperation organizations
According to the analysis of the above questionnaire, findings are as below:
(1)Most of the companies are willing to purchase agricultural p roducts through agricultural cooperation 
organizations.
(2)To secure quality security of raw material is the main reason for the companies to purchase agricultural 
products through agricultural cooperation organizations .
(3)Companies would like to provide various services for peasant households in agricultural cooperation 
organizations.
(4)Most companies consider that close combinations in the agricultural cooperation organizat ions are 
beneficial to quality security of agricultural products .
From the above, the results are in evidence which conform to the analysis of the model: the agricultural 
cooperation organizations are indeed able to produce products according to the requirements and make peasant 
households improve the quality security level of agricu ltural p roducts willingly  so as to defend the 
organizational reputation.
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6. Conclusions 
Cosmides and Tooby (1994) suggest that if certain conditions are met, humans can develop some mutual 
beneficial norms and abilities for social regulat ions[11].This paper shows only if agricultural cooperation 
organizations can provide high-interest services for peasant households, they will cherish the chance which 
brings them long-term interest, which is defending their own honors. During the long-time evolution and 
learning, they are aware of defending the organizational reputation  village, one product  program. 
This paper also implies that if the  village, one product  program is built on agricultural cooperation 
organizations, it will reduce the phenomenon of peasant households chasing short-term interest which will 
impair the organizational reputation and cut the cost for institutional innovation and transaction expenses, 
considering the decentralized small-scale peasant economy in China. Therefore, it  should be a good 
development model to promote decentralized peasant households to join in  agricultural cooperation 
organizations. 
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